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Introduction
At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, several simultaneous though 
contradictory processes can be observed in the international politics, namely, 
those of integration and fragmentation which are often referred to as “glo-
balization” and “ethnicization”1. On the one hand, international markets are 
being formed, the globalization of communication means is under way and 
political, economic and cultural interdependence is being enhanced. On the 
other hand, various transitions - a simultaneous transformation of political, 
economic and other social systems, entailing the rise of local self-conscious-
ness - take place in separate political systems. These processes, observed even 
in the so-called developed west European countries, are especially clear-cut 
in the former socialist and Soviet countries. The significance of each of these 
countries is intensified by the fact that the transformation of a political sys-
tem and the development of an economic system take place along with the 
process of the formation of key prerequisites - the state and the political na-
tion. It is precisely the process of determining as to what geographic area will 
acquire political and economic dimensions and who will construct these sys-
tems that is actually taking place in these countries. 
Georgia is the most blatant example of these transformations in this 
regard: with the integration into international structures going on actively, 
the questions key to the building of a state and a nation - where, in what geo-
graphic area the Georgian statehood is being built and who comprise the Georgian 
nation - remain unanswered since 1990-es.
Raising this question in such a way is based on several assumptions: 1. 
a nation is a political entity which can be fully constructed only within the 
context of a state; 2. consequently, until before the formation of the Georgian 
state is not completed, the Georgian nation will not be born. It is precisely 
this process that takes place now.
The aim of the given analysis is to identify main challenges to the for-
mation of the Georgian political nation. The key challenge is to achieve the 
homogeneity of Georgian people (community of people living on the terri-
tory of Georgia) in terms of, at least, political culture, i.e. subjective attitude 
towards political aims and means. Following the abovementioned logic, this 
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aim can be achieved only if the project of state formation is successfully im-
plemented. The key challenge to this project, however, is ethnic conflicts. The 
outcome of the process of formation of the Georgian political nation is there-
fore directly linked to the result of the conflict settlement.
 The above reasoning is based on the synthesis of a number of theo-
retical approaches in the sphere of the formation of a state and nation (na-
tionalism). In general, it is a constructivist and modernist understanding of 
a nation, namely, its linking to the process of political, economic and social 
modernization2. This process is inseparable from the formation of a state as 
an institute of power, which, on its part, is an unintended result of the pro-
cess of the accumulation of power and its economic foundation3. This ap-
proach does not ignore the significance of an ethnic factor as it is obvious 
that states would be formed and nations born more “easily” in places where 
cultural (in a wider sense) prerequisites in the form of common language, re-
ligion and traditions already existed. “Unintendedness” means an accidental 
and unplanned nature of the process where each factor is important. Meth-
odologically, however, it is important to show the effect of the concentration 
of power and resources on the formalization of power instruments, which re-
sulted in the creation of a modern state and a parallel formation of a homog-
enous society - a political nation.
In the following sections of the paper we will briefly describe the pro-
cess of the formation of a state and nation in Europe, local effects of this 
process in separate provinces of empires, and modern challenges faced by 
Georgia. We will see that a western model can be applied in Georgia so that 
a threat of being blamed in Euro-centrism can be avoided. The key argu-
ment here is that the process of modernization, despite its different results, 
went on similarly in eastern and western Europe and Georgia belongs in this 
area. Gellner identifies four zones of the spread of nationalism in Europe 
where this processes developed in different times: Western Europe (dynastic 
kingdoms along the coast of the Atlantic Ocean), Central Europe (the for-
mer Holy Roman Empire), central and eastern Europe (Austrian and Otto-
man Empires), and Eastern Europe (Ottoman and Russian Empires). In the 
fourth zone the process of transition from non-nationalistic to nationalistic 
order continued throughout the 20th century and has not completed yet even 
in the 21st century4.
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The formation of a state and a nation in Europe: from the 
concentration of power to an agency of the power monopoly
Nations are social constructs and they are primarily the result of the 
19th century (political) modernization. Nations and a nation-state, as a mod-
ern form of the state, which replaced a territorial state, is an unintended (un-
planned) by-product of the transformation of the political governance. It was 
realized in parallel to the transformation of a territorial state, under the con-
ditions of a technological and social modernization. Gellner discusses general 
modernization whereas Hobsbawm, in a narrower sense, attributes a special 
importance to issues of political governance5. Moreover, Hobsbawm’s struc-
turalist explanation that the key aim of a nationalistic ideology was to main-
tain a ruling class’ control over subordinates in the conditions of social chang-
es is an exaggeration. It is true that traditional social ties sever during indus-
trial revolutions - where a society was of a nuclear nature before, the indus-
trial revolution caused migration, a traditional entity no longer exists and it 
should be replaced by a “national entity”. Under such circumstances, the ide-
ology of nationalism, with its “invented stories”, assumes the function of the 
control over society and the legitimization of the existing political authority. 
Of course, logic of power can be seen behind the ideology of nationalism but 
not in a narrow class-specific sense. Quite the opposite, the nationalism, from 
the beginning, was closely associated with liberalism which, in structuralist 
understanding, was the ideology of a new class of bourgeoisie. The merger of 
nationalism and conservatism (i.e. the development of nationalism into an 
ideological tool) happened later, in the second half of the 19th century, when 
nation-states were finally formed in Europe6.
Viewing nationalism as an “ideological project” alone conflicts with the 
assumption that a process of nationalism is unintended and a state and na-
tion are by-products of a political modernization. When talking about un-
planned nature, it is assumed that initial goals of the political transformation 
were, as it basically happens in history, different ones than the formation of 
a nation and a nation-state. To be more precise they, in contrast to a rather 
general and ambiguous goal of nationalism, were quite concrete and famil-
iar for that time. In feudal era, political entities (be they empires, city-states 
or princedoms) tried to be prepared for the fulfillment of the main function 
of a feudal state - to wage war. Any political entity in medieval Europe had 
to be prepared (in terms of defense) or was prepared (in terms of attack) to 
wage war. It was not only their legitimate right but also a duty as the vassal 
system was concentrated on ensuring security and in that it differed from a 
natural condition.
69
Formation of a State and a Nation in Modern Georgia: an Unfinished Project?
Waging war required resources. There existed two options to obtain re-
sources: 1. hiring an army with finances, and 2. collecting army through feu-
dal tax (feudal vassals collected an army for their patrons). The first option 
was primarily opted for by trade cities (comp., Italy with its entire caste of 
professional warriors) whilst the second one by feudal territorial monarchies. 
However, the latter also borrowed money to enhance their forces with hired 
regiments. Meanwhile, as the number and density of population increased so 
did the frequency and scale of wars. At the same time the importance of not 
only war but also preparations for war as well as post-war stages grew more 
apparent. Those who undertook preparations for war in due time were gain-
ing a strategic advantage. As regards post-war stages, this issue is more inter-
esting: no essential changes were made to governing systems of occupied ter-
ritories in previous times; for example, where patrons of castles timely made 
truce with aggressors, they continued to govern and their subordinates would 
not have to be concerned about who was their sovereign’s sovereign - a Span-
ish king or a French one.7
The higher the frequency of wars, the larger was the interest of political 
forces toward resources. This has also conditioned the formation of a regu-
lar army and the creation of professional military, which eventually formal-
ized only under a nation-state. An increased demand for resources gradually 
forced a political center to shift from an indirect leveled governance style to-
ward a direct one.8 A political center starts building up a rudimentary bu-
reaucracy which first establishes control over taxation, then interferes in the 
redistribution of capital and finally, in the production process and thus, the 
communication is established (road, mail, telegraph). The state interferes in 
local spheres of a society and an individual, which have been regulated ear-
lier by traditions.
What is the key outcome of the establishment of the direct governance? 
Attempts toward the concentration of power create a state monopoly on vi-
olence which no longer puts up with a diversified, feudal model of political 
governance with different types of “governance” at various local levels. The 
homogenization of the political governance facilitates the homogenization 
of a society. A common bureaucracy can hardly be imagined without literacy 
and knowledge of a common language. The state, therefore, starts thinking 
about an elementary education system. The education system (military edu-
cational institutions at an initial stage) facilitates social mobility and the first 
possibilities and the motivation for the mobility between social strata emerge.
This time, the state deliberately supports this process - exaggerates his-
torical realities or creates historical myths; creates new symbols - a national 
flag, national anthem, national architecture; enhances the belief in homoge-
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neity of the society - to breed patriots becomes the key goal of the education 
system. The nationalism now really becomes ideology in the hands of the 
elite, which facilitates the expansion of own identity among masses.
The fact that it was not an easy process can be seen by the example of 
the French revolution. In 1793-1794, the revolutionary terror took the lives 
of tens of thousands of people for the only reason that Jacobins were keen to 
implement these inevitable changes at a very high pace. Peasants of Vandée 
as well as of other provinces were against such an engineering of the state. 
Supposedly, they were supported by local elites as this challenge was of an 
existential nature for the latter. Although, ultimately, Jacobins fell victims to 
their own guillotine, France, as a result, outpaced every European country in 
the formation of a nation-state and nation. It should be said that until the 
end of the 19th century masses showed no interest towards nationalism. De-
spite a political unification of Italy and Germany, the German and Italian na-
tionalism reached a mass scale only through active efforts undertaken by the 
political authority. A cultural nationalism was characteristic for elites whilst 
masses maintained their allegiance to regional identities9.
The formation of states in Europe and local effects
The formation of nation-states put an end to political entities exist-
ing earlier. City-states and princedoms became integrated into nation-states 
whereas empires fell apart. However, this project also was not pre-planned, 
which makes the mistakenness of a primordial approach obvious. How could 
otherwise be explained the survival of such mini-states as Andorra, San-
Marino, Monaco, Lichtenstein or the success of such a  multiethnic state as 
Switzerland? Why Bavaria failed to “survive” whilst Austria, on the contrary, 
was not included in a unified Germany? These examples illustrate that the 
formation of a nation-state and, accordingly, a political nation, was first and 
foremost conditioned by political processes rather than cultural roots.
Cultural prerequisites became more significant in those regions (main-
ly, empires) where the center failed to successfully implement a process of 
political modernization. In such cases local entities (at the level of elites and 
not masses!) mastered modernization mechanisms obtained from the state 
but used them to enhance their own identities. The defeat of empires in pan-
European wars contributed to them as well - the defeat and the weakening 
of the Spanish Empire was followed by the formation of Latin American 
countries; the downfall of Austrian and Ottoman empires and their defeat in 
the World War I was followed by the formation of eastern Europe. A partial 
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breakup of the Russian Empire resulted in the formation of even such na-
tions which lacked a strong ethnic foundation - Finland, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania could be quoted as examples. It seems useless, from the practical 
point of view, to ask whether the Georgian nationalism could be the creator 
of a Georgian political nation if in 1917, the revolution was not followed by 
a Bolshevik coup and Russia did not disintegrate even temporarily.
Territorial states in western Europe managed to form modern states 
and construct political nations within more or less “traditional” boundaries 
whereas the modernization carried out by empires in east Europe accord-
ing to the same logic helped create a new political map. The process, which 
started late 19th century with the disintegration of the Austrian, Ottoman and 
Russian empires, continued with the breakup of the Soviet Union at the end 
of the 20th century and has not ended yet in this area.
The building of state and the construction 
of nation in modern Georgia 
After the Bolshevik takeover in October, 1917, leaders of the Caucasus 
waited for the situation to be cleared up in the centre for several months and 
it was only in April 1918, and due to pressure from external forces, that they 
declared their independence. The same happened in case of the democratic 
republic of Georgia, although the national consciousness in Georgia started 
to develop in the second half of the 19th century10. Similarly to other empires 
(see, above), the Georgian nationalism mastered those mechanisms of mod-
ernization which, normally, should have served the goal of creating a ho-
mogenous population of the empire. The most visible, in this regard, was the 
establishment of The Society for the Spread of Literacy among Georgians.
Three incomplete years of independence proved to be insufficient for 
the formation of the Georgian political elite.11 The situation was aggravated 
by repressions of 1920-es and 1930-es, when an entire stratum of the car-
riers of a Georgian nationalistic idea was actually demolished. A new wave 
of nationalism in Georgia started in the Soviet era with Soviet intelligentsia 
and nomenclature being its carriers. The development logic should have also 
been similar to that of the second half of the 19th century with the difference 
that this time better mechanisms for the spread of nationalistic ideas existed 
in the form of schools and mass media. From 1960-es, the Soviet Union first 
entered the stagnation and then the disintegration phases. Consequently, the 
mechanisms for the formation of homogenous Soviet nation - bureaucracy, 
education system -acquired local consumers. Since 1960-es, local nomencla-
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ture and intelligentsia became increasingly “national” which translated into 
boundaries of the republic becoming acceptable limits for their career devel-
opment. The same logic is revealed in monuments, prose, poetry and more 
importantly, school textbooks dedicated to patriotic themes. The fact that in 
the republics of the southern Caucasus the textbooks on the national history 
offered schoolchildren radically different views is probably a topic of a sepa-
rate research.
Since the second half of the 1980-es, when the central authority of 
the Soviet Union started to erode and the propaganda of nationalistic ideas 
broke out of control, these ideas found a larger mass support as compared to 
the beginning of the 20th century. Moreover, irredentism especially transpired 
in those regions where formal germs of political institutes had already been 
observed; these were, apart from Soviet republics, ethnic autonomies12. This 
probably also proves the assumption that nationalism becomes a mass one 
only in the conditions of a political entity.
Two attempts of the formation of a Georgian nation have been distin-
guished since 1990-es to date13. The first, the Gamsakhurdia period, when a 
political construction of a Georgian nation started with ethnocentric nation-
alism and was followed by the enactment of at least two counter-projects in 
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, was a failure. At the same time, however, 
the transformation of various social systems (education, territorial adminis-
tration, communication), though still in a nascent phase, proved to be strong 
enough to make the issue of national statehood irreversible for the Georgian 
society. The second, the Saakashvili period, when the political (civic) nation-
alism has come to the fore in the political construction of the Georgian na-
tion and the state started intervention into a social space in a more prepared 
manner, has not ended yet.
It is interesting that the logic and the rhetoric of the state and nation 
building in Georgia replicate the European experience. In addition to state 
symbols, the state’s attempt to reform education system, improve efficiency of 
central and territorial structures in terms of tax reform, are obvious. The ef-
forts of the state to mobilize resources and to channel a large portion of it to-
ward military capacities are especially noteworthy.14 At present, Georgia is on 
the stage of a state-led nationalism. However, relying on the assumption that 
the projects of state and nation formation are undefined, on the one hand, 
and considering a fact of two unsettled conflicts, on the other, it seems prema-
ture to talk about final contours of the Georgian state and Georgian nation.
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Conclusion
The formation of a nation-state and a nation in the European region 
turned out to be an outcome of a historical accident. The states emerged with-
in separate territorial political entities through the concentration of power 
which, in its turn, was conditioned by frequent wars. The mobilization of re-
sources needed to prepare for wars, wage wars and manage post-war stages 
preconditioned the formation of a civil bureaucracy and a military vertical. 
As economic and social modernization processes went on in parallel, the par-
ticipation in these processes was increasing. At a certain stage, the established 
states deliberately facilitated the homogenization of own population through 
the introduction of an education system, direct governance structures. Where 
this project was implemented successfully, local identities were replaced by 
national ones but where the intervention of the center was unsystematic and 
weak and local differences huge, a local elite used intervention mechanisms 
for the implementation of its own project. This process was not painless on 
any of the occasions; it was accompanied by bloodsheds labeled as counter-
revolutions or liberation movements by the history. The second way of the 
development was more characteristic for the empires in eastern Europe. In 
the beginning of the 20th century new nation-states and nations emerged on 
the basis of Austrian, Ottoman and partially, Russian empires, some of which 
developed their national consciousness only thereafter. The Russian Empire 
continued with its existence in a somewhat changed form until the end of 
the 20th century and produced a new wave of nationalism by its disintegra-
tion. The formation of a nation-state and nation in Georgia was associated 
with ethnic conflicts. A project of ethnic nationalism developed in the Soviet 
Georgia has not extended over at least two regions, those of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. These two regions also remain isolated from a current project 
of a rather political nationalism. The outcome of the project largely depends 
on the duration of the maintenance of the status quo and on the mode of a 
final result.
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